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Abstract: Whereas in other MENA countries the impact of neo-liberal policies has been 
the subject of intense debate, there are at present few voices that directly analyse or 
critique its social and political consequences in Iran. This article seeks to address this 
lacuna by analysing the dynamics of reformism, economic liberalisation and popular 
mobilisation in Iran. It charts the country’s move from a post-revolutionary populism to 
a liberalised yet increasingly exclusivist model of politics and compares this to 
trajectories of economic liberalisation in Egypt. Two distinct outcomes of economic 
reform are analysed in the first part of the article: Socio-economic exclusion; and the 
contraction of political rights. In the second half, I investigate the ways successive post-
war governments in Iran have packaged neo-liberal reforms, and how their re-imagining 
of the role of the state has led to differing levels of popular resistance. Finally I argue 
that under the present administration, political elites increasingly are oriented toward 
strengthening the state and seeking to limit opposition to their policies. However, the 
absence of neo-liberal hegemony in Iran means that growing mobilization on socio-
economic issues is challenging these policies. The Right in Iranian politics is utilizing 
this mobilisation to present a populist challenge to the reformists in power.  
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Following the election of a ‘liberal’ administration in 2013, its re-election in 2017 and 
the nuclear deal of 2015, academics and political commentators identified a watershed 
moment in Iran’s history, with the possibility of ending the country’s international 
isolation, opening up its economy and liberalising the political system. As a developing 
economy and a country with a large, urbanised and youthful population, Iran represents 
a major market for western goods and products. Adam Tarock writes, for example, that 
former senior advisor to the World Bank, Nadereh Chamlou,  argued that a post-nuclear 
Iran represents the most lucrative market for the West in the Middle East.1 The World 
Bank’s country overview of Iran began with an echo of this assessment, stating that Iran 
is the second largest economy in the Middle East with an estimated GDP in 2015 of 
US$393.7 billion, and has the second largest population of any country in the region, 60 
percent of which are under the age of 30. The World Bank’s publication, “Iran’s economic 
outlook” for March 2016 stated that Iran’s economy is expected to grow rapidly over the 
next two years at 4.2 percent and 4.6 percent as a result of the lifting of sanctions and the 
fostering of a “more business oriented environment.”2 It warned, however, that a key 
challenge for Iran in achieving these high levels of growth relates to “the prospect of 
undertaking structural reforms that can move the country toward the sustained and 
inclusive growth envisaged in its sixth five-year plan.”3  
Economic liberalisation is being framed as an essential part of the ‘opening up’ 
of Iran to the world after many years of international isolation and the rationalisation of 
its political system to bring it in line with other successful international economies. These 
hopes are largely responsible for what Kaveh Ehsani argues is a consensus, both inside 
and outside of the country, in which privatisation has been portrayed as “the technocratic 
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rationalization of a hopelessly deadlocked economy” and the cure for “a host of social 
and political ills, from authoritarianism to corruption and nepotism.”4  
In this article I delve into the consequences of neo-liberal reforms in Iran. In the 
first section I analyse where Iran sits within debates on neo-liberalism and present a 
comparative analysis of the experience of economic reform in Egypt – a country with a 
long history of liberalisation. I utilise socio-economic data on Iran in order to demonstrate 
that the last thirty years have seen a contraction of economic and potentially political 
rights that are comparable to the Egyptian case. In the second, I critically examine the 
ways in which neo-liberal policies were packaged by successive post-war administrations 
within Iran. Finally, I argue that the lack of neo-liberal hegemony in Iran which relates to 
the identity and legitimacy of the revolutionary republic, has presented opportunities both 
for popular mobilisation and for the resurgence of right-wing populist forces. 
 
Comparative Analysis of Economic Reform  
Analysis of the linkages between the economic and political characteristics of a state has 
been explored in a large body of literature, much of which posits a positive correlation 
between economic development and political liberalisation.5 However, the idea that 
economic reform programs consisting of privatisation, the development of the private 
sector, rolling back of subsidies, trade tariffs and welfare programs would engender 
political liberalisation has been the subject of substantial criticism. Instead theorists have 
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argued that neo-liberal economic policies strengthen the authoritarian features of the 
state.6 A number of reasons have been put forward to explain the convergences between 
economic reform and authoritarianism. Firstly, economic reforms which result in 
economic hardship for the majority of the population lead to a loss of legitimacy for states 
and political elites and therefore encourage states to rely on repression.7  Secondly, rather 
than producing smaller and more accountable states, neo-liberal reforms and privatisation 
of state assets do not lessen the role of the state in the economy. Instead, the focus of state 
intervention shifts from welfarism and corporatism to militarisation with the expansion 
of the security sector, police, military groups and private security companies. In these 
‘securocratic states’ a ‘security discourse’ prevails where political elites articulate a 
hegemony based on ideas of providing safety and security rather than welfare. ‘Safety’ 
here implies protection from both overseas threats and importantly from elements within 
the domestic population which leads to high levels of domestic surveillance and 
detention.8 Thirdly, new classes are empowered through the processes of neo-liberal 
reform. However, contrary to arguments that a reform minded independent class would 
support political liberalisation, a number of cases from the former Soviet countries, Latin 
America and the Middle East, have demonstrated that “powerful interest groups” 
connected to the state  have been the main beneficiaries of reform.9 
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        Egypt has been regarded as emblematic of this form of neo-liberal authoritarian as a 
post-populist state characterised by increasingly exclusionary policies as well as the 
empowerment of the military and security sector. Egypt was among the first countries to 
liberalise its economic system under the policies of infitah introduced by Anwar Sadat in 
the 1970s. More draconian neo-liberal policies were implemented by Sadat’s successor, 
Mubarak, and in 2007 Egypt was praised by the World Bank for being the world’s most 
successful economic reformer.  
As a result of the restructuring of the economy and deregulation in order to attract 
foreign investment, unemployment and poverty levels in Egypt skyrocketed to some of 
the worst in the region.10 A number of commentators hoped that the opening up of Egypt’s 
markets to foreign goods and Foreign Direct investment (FDI) would benefit the country, 
both economically and socially. However, FDI was slow to materialise and did not create 
enough jobs to replace the destruction of substantial sectors of the economy and the public 
sector. Limited investment was concentrated in the areas of tourism, service industries 
and real estate speculation, which led to massively inflated real estate prices and a housing 
crisis in the major cities.11  
Unemployment and underemployment grew, particularly among educated youth 
as the public sector was dismantled, and the new jobs that were created were notoriously 
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badly paid, casualised and unstable. At the same time, cuts to government subsidies and 
welfare led to soaring food and energy costs and the destruction of the safety net. As a 
number of authors have noted, the convergence of these factors contributed in no small 
way to the outbreak of the 2011 uprising in Egypt.12 In addition, Egypt did not experience 
political liberalisation as a result of these reforms, or a lessening of the control of the 
state. Instead, the state continued to play a major role in the economy and society, 
becoming more authoritarian in order to put down dissent to its increasingly unpopular 
policies.13 As a result of these processes, Egypt’s political system became a “securocratic 
state.”14 
In Egypt neo-liberal policies were introduced by a series of military dictatorships, 
whereas in Iran, they have been associated with elected administrations.  However, neo-
liberal policies have had similar effects in the different contexts where they have been 
introduced.15 Egypt is a comparable case to Iran due to its large and mainly urbanised, 
youthful population. In addition, neo-liberal policies were introduced in Egypt in the 
1970s in the context of a similar ideological consensus that they would solve the problems 
associated with statist policies and produce a smaller and more accountable state.  
The aims of neo-liberal reform in both contexts are comparable. As in Egypt, a 
major goal of economic reform in Iran is to deregulate the economy in order to encourage 
foreign investment. In October 2016 the English language newspaper Keyhan 
International reported on a series of foreign investment deals after a successful two-day 
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trip to Tehran by the German minister for the Economy Sigmar Gabriel, including a 
contract to upgrade Iran's railway network signed by the German company Siemens.16 
The English-language Iranian economics daily, the Financial Tribune, reported that in 
the same month President Hassan Rouhani extended an invitation to the 2020 Investment 
Association, a group of influential investors overseeing $7 trillion of assets, to visit Iran 
in January 2017.17  In a bid to attract foreign investors, the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, 
Industries, Mines and Agriculture planned a “roadshow” of Iranian companies to visit 
London in December 2016 in order to meet with European asset managers, sovereign 
wealth funds and pension funds.18 Foreign investors are also being sought in the 
politically sensitive oil and natural gas sector.19   
In addition to foreign and international aid revenue, tourism and the expansion of 
the service industries catering to foreign tourists was a major plank of economic reform 
in Egypt.  Similarly, alongside attracting foreign investment, increasing tourism is a major 
goal of President Rouhani’s economic reform program. Indeed, Keyhan reported that 
Deputy Finance Minister Muhammad Khazae offered foreign hotel chains 100% tax 
holidays of “between five to 13 years.”20 The drive to encourage foreign investment and 
tourism within Iran is taking place against a backdrop of an enormous crisis within the 
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Middle East and as such it has important political ramifications.21 In both the domestic 
and foreign press, Iran has been advertised as the “safest” country in the Middle East both 
for tourists and foreign investors. For example, the newspaper Ettela'at reported that at a 
conference in Beijing, Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Ali Tayebnia, referred 
to Iran as “the safest country in the region for foreign investors” particularly in the context 
of the current regional crisis.22 However, foreign governments also use the leverage 
provided by potential trade deals to exert political pressure on Iran as reports of pressure 
being placed on Iran by German representatives to “normalise relations with Israel” and 
stop intervening in the Syrian conflict demonstrate.23  
In addition, the social and political impact of neo-liberal policies in Iran are 
similar to those seen in Egypt in the areas of unemployment, poverty and militarisation. 
However, as this article demonstrates, in the case of Iran the negative effects of these 
policies have been somewhat offset by welfarist measures undertaken by the state to 
ensure its own survival.  Over the past three decades Iran has experienced rising 
unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, poverty levels and soaring real-estate 
prices, as well as privatisation, the destruction of the public sector and the empowerment 
of the security sector. Iranian census data shows that unemployment  increased gradually 
from 11.5 percent in 2005 to 12.1 percent in 2012. Youth unemployment increased more 
rapidly, from 23.2 percent in 2005 to 26.8 percent in 2012. In a number of respects, 
however, the situation has deteriorated more markedly for middle class and working class 
Iranians than this data reveal. The housing crisis is an important part of this equation. 
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There is a saying in Tehran that the most lucrative business to be in at the moment is that 
of “selling air.”  This refers to the business of real-estate speculation, the ‘air’ referring 
both to the vertical spaces of the city and the huge profits that are generated for investors 
in high-rise apartment construction. As in the case of Egypt, real estate speculation has 
driven up house prices and rents to unaffordable levels. Kaveh Ehsani has analysed the 
housing crisis effecting Iranian cities since the 1990s, noting the average dwelling size in 
Tehran has fallen by half as a result of real-estate speculation. Private-sector investment 
in new urban construction in Tehran quadrupled in four years between 1998 to 2002, 
whereas state investment in affordable housing over the same period has been 
negligible.24 Real-estate speculation has benefited those who can afford to invest in 
property, shifting the economic burden to the majority of the working population. 
The second comparable social outcome of neo-liberalism in Iran is in poverty. 
Historically, poverty levels have been difficult to calculate, although several analysts 
have pointed to an alarming increase in poverty over the past decade.  Poverty rates also 
have increased substantially in rural areas. Over the past decade 10.4 percent of Iran's 
urban population was classified as living below the absolute poverty line, as compared to 
22.6 percent of rural inhabitants.  At the same time, Iran is a relatively wealthy country 
in global terms. As an oil economy, Iran has been able to generate high levels of income 
for the state and, in the post-revolutionary era, has been able to channel this income into 
welfare provision. This has allowed the state to protect the population from economic 
shocks such as the removal of subsidies by directly compensating them through programs 
such as the cash subsidy introduced by the Ahmadinejad administration in 2010. 
According to economists, over the following year (fiscal year 2011-2012) the cash 
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subsidy scheme increased median annual incomes by one-third and has proven enduringly 
popular.25 
The final aspect of Iran’s neo-liberal trajectory is that of militarisation. In Iran, 
neo-liberal economic policies have not led to the lessening of state power. Privatisation 
has led to the empowerment of a class of bureaucratic and military state elites with power 
invested in different parts of the state.  In particular, the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) has 
become the major beneficiaries of privatisation and the selling off of billions of dollars 
of state assets.  This national security-military institution is often portrayed as 
conservative and essentially a vestige of revolutionary ideology. However, it is important 
to note that despite engaging in the rhetoric of anti-imperialism, it is the IRGC which, as 
it controls most of the economy, has the most to gain from liberalisation and ‘open door’ 
projects. 
Despite the fact that Iranians have been partially shielded from the most socially 
exclusionary outcomes of economic reform due to compensation and welfare programs, 
there is consensus that the solution to the country’s economic problems is further 
privatisation measures and the removal of protections from workers in order to stimulate 
economic growth. Iranian economist Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, whose analyses the World 
Bank utilizes in Iran publications, has argued that rising unemployment in Iran is due to 
the rigidity of post-revolution labour policies, in particular the protections available to 
older workers who are guaranteed five month’s severance pay should they be made 
redundant. This difficulty in getting rid of the older workforce, in addition to the “youth 
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bubble” are in Salehi-Isfahani’s opinion, responsible for the fact that over 35% of 
university graduates are unemployed and are, as he argues, trapped in the condition 
known as “waithood” – where they cannot find work or work that is highly paid enough 
to get married, move out of their parent’s houses and establish families of their own.26 
However, in Egypt neo-liberal policies exacerbated unemployment or led to the 
phenomena of underemployment, where new entrants to the job market, in particular 
youth and women increasingly are employed in casualised industries or in the informal 
economy and struggle to earn a living wage. As Shahram Khosravi has noted, this is the 
real cost of economic reform in Iran where the increasing levels of poverty in rural areas 
are motivating people to move to cities to join the “growing urban precariat, who are 
exploited as cheap and docile workers in the informal labor market,” raising the number 
of Iranians living in slums to almost 10 million (17 times higher than before the revolution 
in 1979).27  These new workers are part of the employment trend observed by Sohrab 
Behdad since the revolution where a ‘reserve army’ of unemployed workers have found 
two industries open to them; the service industry and the security forces28  – another 
feature of the militarisation of the economy. There is no evidence that removing existing 
protections from established workers will address these issues. 
Moreover Hossein Askari and Noora Arfaa argue that improvements in the living 
standard of the majority of Iranians in the first decade after the revolution came about not 
due to the creation of stable employment but to the welfare and subsidy policies, which 
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made “remarkable improvements in poverty alleviation and in key human development 
indicators.”29  It is clear then that the policies deemed by many economists today as 
inefficient and a barrier to growth such as “formal social safety net programs, 
employment guarantees, consumer subsidies, cash transfers and universal health and 
education services”30 in fact have shielded the majority of Iranians from economic 
disaster. It is also these policies that have been the main target of economic liberalisation 
programs.  
Thus, the Iranian state’s ‘oil populism’ and its ability to compensate its population 
through welfare and cash subsidy schemes have complicated discussions of the social 
impact of economic reform measures. Indeed most economists argue that the economic 
problems of the country are due, not to neo-liberal policies, but to continued state 
domination of the economy, its interference in the private sector, inefficiencies and 
corruption.31 There are, however, a number of problems with this approach. Firstly it 
tends to treat Iran as a unique case and ignore the evidence of the social and political costs 
of reform from other comparable contexts such as Egypt. Secondly, there is growing 
evidence of rising poverty levels in the country and a real danger that poverty levels will 
rise dramatically in future as a result of new sanctions and the fact that the cash 
compensation scheme is no longer able to outstrip rising prices.  
More recent discussions have focussed on the economic impact of sanctions, with 
analysts arguing that it is sanctions, rather than neo-liberalism, which are to blame for the 
country’s economic misfortunes. There is no doubt that sanctions have had a profoundly 
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dislocating impact on the economy. The country has endured four rounds of UN economic 
sanctions in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010. In 2010 the CISADA barred the US government 
from awarding contracts to companies and businesses that did business with Iran. In that 
same year EU unilateral sanctions were introduced and in 2012 the SWIFT banking and 
financial sanctions came into effect. Altogether these have represented a “comprehensive 
sanction against the whole economy.” 32  
However, the problem with arguments that shift the blame from neo-liberalism 
and onto sanctions is that sanctions both directly and indirectly have enabled further 
privatisation of the economy.  Nader Habibi, among others, argues that the IRGC 
(Revolutionary Guard), in particular, have benefited from the duel processes of sanctions 
and neo-liberal reforms that were introduced during the Ahmadinejad era. As foreign 
investment was not possible under the sanctions regime, it was the IRGC which gained 
significant economic assets through stepping in as a ‘substitute contractor’ and buying 
industries that were sold off by the state or went bankrupt as a result of the sanctions 
regime. This was particularly the case in the oil, natural gas, transport and construction 
industries.33 The sanctions regime also gave the government an excuse to implement 
unpopular economic reforms such as the removal of price subsidies in 2010, and which 
the IMF praised as going further than any other oil-exporting country would have dared.34 
The argument that it is sanctions rather than economic reform which has hurt the majority 
of the country and empowered a military-business elite, does not take into account the 
ways in which sanctions and economic reform have worked hand in hand.  
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The case of Iran demonstrates many of the outcomes of economic reform which 
empowers “powerful interest groups” while having negative consequences for the 
majority of the population. Rising poverty, the lowering of living standards, removal of 
the safety net and the housing crisis have been the result of neo-liberal reforms in Iran 
and yet are nowhere to be found in the economic predictions of the World Bank. 
Nevertheless they are greatly contributing to the phenomena of “waithood.” A 
comparative analysis of economic reform demonstrates that further economic 
liberalisation potentially may engender social and political conflict which will encourage 
elites to fall back on political repression as a means of maintaining social control. This is 
particularly the case as the two areas which the current administration is hoping will bring 
in much needed economic stimulus - tourism and foreign investment – are dependent on 
Iran maintaining its image as a lucrative island of stability in an otherwise crisis-ridden 
region.  
A final aspect of the consensus surrounding the necessity of further economic reform 
measures is political. In Iran neo-liberalism is fundamentally associated with a move 
away from revolutionary ideology and intransigence and toward the triumph of the liberal 
bourgeoisie in the country’s political and economic spheres. Indeed, reformist 
administrations, publically committed to projects of political and social openness, the 
empowering of civil society and the ending of the country’s international isolation, have 
become among those most associated with economic reform. At the same time, the 
absence of neo-liberal hegemony in the country means that this project has been met with 
resistance and popular mobilisation, both of which have increased since 2017. 
Interactions between Reformism, Neo-liberalism and popular mobilisation 
The terms ‘reformists,’ ‘conservatives’ and ‘populists’ refer to political groupings, all of 
which have contested meanings. Although Iran does not operate a multi-party system, it 
is a fluid political system in which publically identifiable factional groupings within the 
state compete openly in an at times hotly contested political debate in the media and other 
venues.   Hossein Akhavi-Pour and Heidar Azodanloo identify two major factional 
groupings: Moderates and conservatives. They argue that the moderate group, in which 
are included “liberals, reformers, technocrats and pragmatists, “believe that Islam and 
democracy are compatible” and are “looking for a state that accommodates Islam as a 
faith.”35 In contrast, conservatives or traditionalists are sometimes seen as ‘principalists,’ 
i.e., adhering to the principles of the revolution as they “believe in the notion of velayat-
e faqih”36 and the supreme rule of a religious jurist. It is important to note that the 
boundaries and politics of these groups are not impermeable. For example, many 
important figures who in contemporary discourse are referred to as either moderates or 
reformists were hand-picked by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to serve in the first post-
revolutionary government of the 1980s when they were part of the ‘Islamic left’ faction.  
Complicating this picture are the third group of para-statal organisations consisting of the 
Nehads or foundations established after the revolution, and para-military organisations 
such as the IRGC (Islamic Revolution Guard Corps).  During the Ahmadinejad 
administration (2005-2013) these groups supported the new conservative faction which 
coalesced around the president, however their politics are fluid and several factions within 
these groups historically have supported reformist candidates. Indeed, during the 2013 
presidential election they were not able to unite behind one candidate.37   
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Reformism in Iran connects ideologically to a long history of both Islamic 
reformism and secular liberalism as movements and popular strands of political thought 
in the country.38 It is also similar in its political outlook to other ‘post-Islamist’ parties 
and movements such as the wassateyya in Egypt, an-Nahda in Tunisia or the AKP in 
Turkey, each of which has played an important role in politics over the past twenty years. 
Populism also has a long history in Iranian politics. Ervand Abrahamian, among others, 
has compared the post-revolutionary state in Iran with the post-revolutionary ‘populist’ 
systems in Latin America with their combination of centralisation of power, charismatic 
leadership, state welfare programs and political repression.39 Populism  more recently has 
been used to refer to the new conservative’s appropriation of leftist discourses of 
economic equality and the popular resistance to neo-liberal projects associated with the 
current administration.   
It is important to note that neo-liberal policies were introduced by all post-war 
administrations, whether technocratic, conservative, reformist or populist. However, the 
level and nature of opposition to these reforms has changed according to the discourse 
utilised by state elites. In this way, although economic policies may have remained more 
or less consistent, the ideological ‘packaging’ of those policies has engendered differing 
levels of resistance. In this section I analyse the main phases of the history of economic 
reform in Iran: Technocratic, reformist and conservative-populist. Analysis of these 
trends can shed light on the current popular mobilisations, which oppose the economic 
policies of the Rouhani administration.   
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Structural adjustment policies were introduced by the Rafsanjani administration 
which referred to itself as a new party – hizb -- of technocrats and functionaries, 
Kargozaran. Rafsanjani’s administration (1989-1997) came to power in the context of an 
on-going social and economic crisis caused by the war and the switching of factional 
allegiances following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989; it oversaw the re-writing 
of the revolutionary constitution and the privatisation of 400 nationalised enterprises. 
This process included the transfer of billions of dollars from the state, some of which 
were bought up by the nehads and IRGC, which began to play an important role in the 
economy during this period.  
Rafsanjani’s structural adjustment took the form of currency devaluation, price 
liberalisation and privatisation.  Despite Iran’s international isolation following the US 
embassy occupation in 1979, in the following decade the country became a member of 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 1991 the World Bank provided 
Iran with a $250 million loan. A further $850 million was promised in 1994 conditional 
on further structural adjustment measures.  In March 1993 the government had floated 
the rial, and in 1993-94, it began raising the price of goods and services. In that year 
prices of natural gas, telephone, post, electricity, inner city transport and airlines increased 
– some by more than 100%.40 However, in many ways this initial experiment with neo-
liberalism was deemed a failure. The value of the currency had to be stabilised and a 
system of multiple exchange rates was introduced which in effect acted as a subsidy. Price 
liberalisation and privatisation in the 1990s were also introduced slowly with many starts 
and stops. On one occasion in 1993, the Iranian Majles approved a 100 percent increase 
in the price of gasoline on the day after President Rafsanjani and Supreme Leader 
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Khamenei had spoken out on behalf of the poor.41 This form of ‘zig-zag’ economic reform 
in which policies of structural adjustment are introduced at the same time as those which 
are intended to ensure the overall survival of political regimes, is well known to the 
Middle East, and was pursued by the Mubarak regime in Egypt during the same period.  
In Iran, as in other post-populist states, political elites not only are interested in 
their own survival but also are committed to a welfarist and revolutionary identity for the 
state.  Thus, it has been important for politicians to claim that they have been acting ‘in 
the best interests’ of the poor. This has also been reflected in the fact that the government 
ramps up such discourses when faced with increasing economic discontent and popular 
mobilisation. However, reformists have attempted to move away from the revolutionary 
discourse in which the state exists to serve the people, to a new one – that of civil society, 
transparency and rights. As Sohrab Behdad points out, this political project entails the re-
centering of the bourgeoisie in Iranian politics, who were “battered in the revolution” and 
acceding to their demands for liberalisation by raising “the banner of economic 
liberalism, demanding denationalization (privatisation) of industries and deregulation of 
the market.”42 
It therefore is not surprising that neo-liberalism was a fundamental part of the 
political discourse of reformism. In the 1990s neo-liberal reforms were posited as being 
important for the growth of non-state groups such as civil society organisations and social 
movements. These ideas were part of mainstream Western development discourses and 
were developed in the work of important Iranian reformist intellectuals who saw a historic 
opening for non-state organisations to flourish as a product of the loosening of the state’s 
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corporatist populism.43 As such, intellectuals such as Akbar Ganji merged the ideas of the 
technocratic Rafsanjani administration with the argument that it was liberalism, not 
revolution, which constituted the truest expression of the national aspirations of the 
Iranian people. In practice, Ganji and others supported privatisation measures and argued 
that these would entail a lessening of the power of the state, and a flourishing of ‘civil 
society.’44 These ideas found practical expression in the reformist administration of 
Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005) whose policies centred on ideas of democracy and 
pluralism as ways of strengthening both the state and civil society.   
However, the reformists of the 1990s were not successful in convincing a majority 
of the electorate of their neo-liberal vision of civil society and a new identity for the state.  
Their economic and foreign policy failures alienated many in the working population, 
while liberals were disappointed by Khatami’s refusal to confront the supreme leader 
following attacks on student protesters in 1999. These factors allowed a new conservative 
coalition to gain power under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Those on the 
right of Iranian politics such as the Ahmadinejad administration (2005-2013) also 
embraced policies of economic reform. Indeed, under President Ahmadinejad the 1979 
constitution was amended to enable full privatisation of the public sector. However, the 
Ahmadinejad administration did not, like the reformists, seek to move away from the 
revolutionary rhetoric of the state. Similar to the zig-zag privatisation described during 
the Rafsanjani era, in its political rhetoric, the Ahmadinejad administration stressed socio-
economic issues and claimed to act on behalf of the poor and oppressed.45 The mass 
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protests of the ‘Green movement’ that occurred during the Ahmadinejad administration 
were thus centred on political, rather than economic issues. 
The current Rouhani government has embraced neo-liberalism in both policy and 
rhetoric. In policy terms this has meant privatisation of communications and 
manufacturing sectors, as well as government services such as water distribution, in 
addition to removal of subsidies and the dismantling of welfare services and the public 
sector. The Rouhani administration also has linked its neo-liberal economic agenda to the 
seeking of a rapprochement with the West. In terms of foreign policy, President Rouhani 
has continued the reformist goal of opening up Iran’s market to the rest of the world, 
deepening both regional ties and international trade agreements. Indeed, President 
Rouhani’s UN resolution, ‘A World without Extremism and Violence,’ adopted in 
December 2013, is seen by Farhang Rouhani, for example, as an expanded form of 
diplomacy tied to a neo-liberal goal of opening borders to foreign capital and trade.46 
The state also has engaged in a security discourse in its attempt to secure 
hegemony. On the one hand, Rouhani’s administration has stressed the language of rights, 
citizenship and government accountability. Indeed, one of Rouhani’s major campaign 
promises came to fruition in December 2016 with the release of a Charter of Citizenship 
Rights. However, Rouhani’s administration also has utilised a security discourse that calls 
for “domestic social harmony” and the maintenance of a strong state. Indeed, the current 
administration’s use of the language of rights is framed as a part of the government’s 
efforts to build and maintain a strong, stable Iranian state and nation. In speeches and 
government documents released over the past year, President Rouhani has stressed that 
maintaining domestic social ‘harmony’ is also invaluable for attracting both tourism and 
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foreign investment. In the same speech quoted above, President Rouhani argued that 
“establishing social peace and economic stability are the government's main goals” and 
that “creating unrest and widening political and social divisions are detrimental to the 
country."  The increasingly hostile international environment that Iran has encountered 
since the election of the Trump administration in the United States also significantly has 
strengthened the perceived political need for a strong state in order to be able to defend 
against any potential future attacks from the US or its allies within the region. 
The Rouhani government is attempting to complete the 1990s project of the 
Khatami administration, which can be interpreted as the triumph of the bourgeoisie in the 
Iranian economic and political system.  This entails, not only a “face off with Iranian 
labour”47 but a re-imagining of the state and the formulation of a neo-liberal hegemony 
based on the idea of the free-market and a liberalised, autonomous workforce.  However, 
as in Egypt, political liberalisation will not be the main result of this societal 
transformation. Zig-Zag neo-liberalism and increasing state penetration of both society 
and economy is not a flaw in this system, it is the only form of neo-liberalism that can 
ensure the continued survival of political elites committed to this project.48 
The rejection by the populace of this new vision of austerity and the security state 
means that Rouhani’s administration is under pressure from a protest and labour 
movement that is able to see-through the promises of social justice made by the state. In 
May 2018, for example, it was reported that there were 17 protests in one day, one of 
which occurred during a ceremony to mark International Labor Day held at Ayatollah 
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Khomeini's shrine, where workers protested about pay and conditions during President 
Rouhani’s speech about the importance of labour.49 
Meanwhile the right in Iranian politics has attempted to embrace a discourse of 
socio-economic equality. This was demonstrated in the 2017 presidential election in 
which the conservative candidates Ebrahim Raisi and Mohammad Qalibaf claimed their 
campaign represented 96 percent of the electorate against the 4 percent of super-rich 
which they identified as the reformists. Despite many predictions that the right would 
make a strong showing in the election, Rouhani won another convincing victory, which 
demonstrates the continued support for reformism and its popular liberal stance on socio-
cultural issues within the country. Having failed to take power through the ballot box, the 
right of Iranian politics has re-mobilised and attempted to co-opt the economic protests 
that erupted in provincial areas and in Tehran December 2017 and January 2018. These 
events indicate a potentially important shift in Iranian politics where reformists are 
moving toward embracing the strong state, whilst conservatives espouse their support for 
popular mobilisation.  
Conclusion 
Rather than viewing Iran as an exceptional case, it is fruitful to look to other trajectories 
of neo-liberal reform in the region, and the consequences of austerity policies elsewhere 
in the world. Far from being associated with increasing socio-economic and political 
participation, economic liberalisation in other contexts has left a legacy of hardening the 
exclusivist features of the state.  In addition, data on the Iranian experience over the past 
twenty years demonstrates that while some aspects of Iran’s economic policies have 
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remained stable over time, the inclusionary policies of the post-revolutionary state 
including welfare, subsidies, public sector employment and access to health and 
education, were important in enabling social mobility. Programs of privatisation and 
liberalisation target these very protections and have led to the destruction of the safety 
net which protected Iranians from economic shocks. Therefore, it should come as no 
surprise that these policies engender popular challenges to the reformist agenda that 
conservative forces can co-opt. As in other contexts, liberalisation in Iran will not be 
implemented evenly, or bring equal benefits to the population. Different groups will 
benefit depending on their historical positioning vis-à-vis the state.  Indeed, the 
experience of other countries and Iran over the past two decades suggests that 
liberalisation of the economy will lead to a deepening of the security-military-business 
alliance, and of a continuing project of ensuring the political power of the state though 
the formulation of exclusivist political discourses of security and the maintenance of a 
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